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POVERTY LAW AND CIVIL PROCEDURE:
RETHINKING THE FIRST-
YEAR COURSE
Helen Hershkoff*
The administration of American justice is not impartial, the rich
and the poor do not stand on an equality before the law, the
traditional method of providing justice has operated to close the
doors of the courts to the poor, and has caused a gross denial of
justice in all parts of the country to millions of persons.1
This Essay explores whether and how to integrate issues of pov-
erty and inequality into the standard first-year course on civil pro-
cedure.  I do not write on an empty slate: conferences and journals
have devoted time to this question, which implicates some of the
foundational issues of procedural justice.2  At least one commenta-
tor posits that civil procedure, unlike constitutional law, “is not
seen as a natural hotbed of ideological controversy,” and so offers
a neutral territory for the exploration of social justice concerns.3
My view is somewhat different.  Precisely because civil procedure
connotes a neutral framework for dispute resolution, some col-
leagues might see efforts to integrate a poverty perspective into the
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ily Bloomenthal, Maria Campigotto, Rebekah Cook-Mack, A.J. Martinez, and Lind-
sey Weinstock for excellent research assistance.  Appreciation also goes to John
Easterbrook for administrative support and to Linda Ramsingh for library assistance.
Finally, thanks go to Paul Carrington for sharing his unpublished manuscript, “Class
Struggle in Civil Procedure: A Dialogue.”
1. REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 8 (Patterson Smith Publish-
ing Co. 1972) (1919).
2. See, e.g., Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers Teaching Conference, Class in the Class-
room, Susan Becker & Paul Carrington, Workshop on Civil Procedure (Oct. 15,
2004), available at http://www.saltlaw.org/teachingconference2004.htm (select “Con-
ference Program” hyperlink to view list of workshops) (last visited Apr. 21, 2007);
Kevin R. Johnson, Integrating Racial Justice into the Civil Procedure Survey Course, 54
J. LEGAL EDUC. 242, 242 (2004) (presenting “the case for raising issues of race, as well
as class and gender, in the civil procedure survey course”).
3. Johnson, supra note 2, at 243-44; see also David M. Trubek, The Handmaiden’s R
Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer Sociology of Civil Procedure, 51 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 114 (1988) (exploring the conventional distinction between
procedure and substance and the notion that procedure is a “transparent medium—
one that does not add or subtract anything”).
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first-year course as an example of special pleading in a system that
ought to value impersonality, impartiality, and the separation of
law from politics.4  The proposed approach therefore demands
some justification—quite apart from social justice concerns that
might motivate fellow travelers.5
Support for the project can be drawn from both the goals of legal
education and the role of lawyers in a democratic society.  First,
asking students to assess the current civil justice system from the
perspective of poverty and inequality comports with the basic aims
of the first-year curriculum: to learn to think critically about legal
arrangements and to assess dispassionately whether existing rules
promote the stated goals of fairness and efficiency for all litigants.
Second, placing procedural rules in a social context helps students
recognize that procedural rules, like all legal rules, result from po-
litical choices that cannot be separated from social values.6  Finally,
at a time when dissatisfaction with the justice system runs high,7
4. See HERVE´ MOULIN, FAIR DIVISION AND COLLECTIVE WELFARE 1 (2003)
(“Justice is blind, and fairness requires anonymous rules of arbitration.”); Richard L.
Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV.
474, 476 (1985) (referring to the “prevailing ideology of advanced capitalism—legal
liberalism” as grounded on the premise that law can be divorced from politics); see
also Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the
Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 802 (2003) (suggesting that discus-
sions of class in any legal context appear to be “uncomfortably radical”).
5. See Students and Lawyers, Doctrine and Responsibility: A Pedagogical Collo-
quy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1107, 1107 (1992) (“Over the past few years, legal educators
have been involved in a growing debate over the responsibility of law schools to pro-
mote social justice within the profession.  Some institutions have failed to respond to
the debate.”); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive
Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2246 (1989)
(discussing the relation between social justice and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
6. See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61
TEX. L. REV. 929, 948 (1983).  Graham writes:
For anyone who is concerned with justice, the most salient feature of con-
temporary American society is the wildly unequal distribution of wealth and
power.  Only the complacent or the ideologically blinded can avoid the issue
of the complicity of rules of procedure in fostering inequality.  But this is
ultimately a question of values, of choosing sides in a deeply political strug-
gle—it cannot be answered by “scientific” methods.  To come down on the
side opposing the status quo is not simply to take up arms against very pow-
erful interests, it is also to abandon the posture of political neutrality that
many proceduralists see as their sole claim to authority.
Id. See also Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513,
534 (2006) (positing that “there is no such thing as a baseline ‘neutral procedure’”).
7. See Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice,
71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 102 (1993) (acknowledging “hostility toward lawyers,” “dis-
comforts of the increasing legalization of society,” and a “system of civil justice . . .
beset by many problems”); see also Wendy Bay Lewis, Lawyer Jokes, Lies and Name-
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training our students to think about possible improvement is a wor-
thy and even essential component of a law school’s mission.  As
Liam B. Murphy explains, “the responsibility that people have in
respect of justice must be to support and bring about just institu-
tions . . . . Since institutions are not agents and don’t actually have
any responsibilities at all, it is only people who can ensure that in-
stitutions satisfy principles of justice.”8
Part I of the Essay sets out a thematic framework for a “stan-
dard” civil procedure first-year course that connects constitutional
and non-constitutional principles to concerns of poverty and ine-
quality.  Part II offers a repertoire of doctrines, cases, and statutes,
largely taken from a traditional civil procedure casebook (“the
Casebook”),9 which can be used to illustrate these themes.  One
might legitimately question whether the formal rules of civil proce-
dure hold any significance for the poor, given the trend toward
“consensual” procedural rules, alternative dispute resolution, and a
general inability of under-resourced litigants to adjudicate merito-
rious claims.10  However salient this criticism, the first-year curricu-
lum emphasizes adjudication as a public process subject to
procedural rules, and I draw my examples from the traditional set
of materials.  Part III briefly concludes by linking the justification
for the proposed approach with the broader mission of legal
education.
I. USING ISSUES OF CLASS AND POVERTY LAW TO EXAMINE
PROCEDURE’S CORE CONCEPTS
Kevin R. Johnson observes, “[f]or many students, Civil Proce-
dure is the first—and thus a very important—exposure to constitu-
tional law in law school.”11  The civil justice system is one of the
major public arenas in which constitutional questions are raised,
litigated, and resolved.  It is also an arena defined and framed by
constitutional understandings.  Examining the relation between
Calling: Public Attitudes Toward the Legal System, 29 MONT. LAW. 10, 13 (2004) (re-
ferring to “a growing atmosphere of scorn for the legal system” in the United States).
8. Liam B. Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 251, 271 (1999).
9. My examples come from the casebook co-authored by Jack H. Friedenthal,
Arthur R. Miller, John E. Sexton, and myself, JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 2005) [hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE], called by one commentator “perhaps the leading casebook
in the field, as well as one of the most traditional.”  Johnson, supra note 2, at 242. R
10. See generally Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
593 (2005) [hereinafter Resnik, Procedure as Contract] (describing the trend).
11. Johnson, supra note 2, at 244. R
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civil procedure and wealth disparities allows students to consider
the ways in which constitutional doctrine shapes the administration
of civil justice and affects the legitimacy and efficiency of the
processes used.  United States procedure also builds on non-consti-
tutional concepts—in particular, the adversary system and the prin-
ciple of transsubstantivity12—that can be better understood from
the perspective of poverty and inequality.
A. Civil Procedure, Constitutional Values, and Party Wealth
Litigation is not just a contest between two opposing private par-
ties.  It also is a state-sanctioned process that uses public money
and is subject to constitutional constraints.13  Within this public law
framework, at least three important constitutional values animate
civil procedure: due process, equality, and rights to association and
expression.14  Nevertheless, the civil procedure canon includes very
few constitutional decisions and of these only a handful accords
any significance to the effect of wealth disparities on dispute reso-
lution processes.  This absence of “constitutional civil procedure”15
comports with the Court’s general unwillingness to treat poverty as
a suspect trait or to accord heightened scrutiny to wealth classifica-
tions.16  Introducing issues of poverty and inequality into the stan-
dard course broadens students’ conceptual framework and allows
them to evaluate not only the operation of specific procedural
rules, but also the overall design and assumptions of the civil jus-
tice system.
12. For more on the concepts of adversarialism and transsubstantivity, see discus-
sion infra Parts I.B.1 and 2.
13. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 2 (“Courts draw R
on public power to resolve controversies.”).
14. To this constitutional trio one might add the Seventh Amendment commit-
ment to jury trial rights. See discussion infra Part II.F; see also OSCAR G. CHASE,
LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT
55-56 (2005) (“It is not hard to see how the historic American attachment to the jury
is bottomed on core American values.  It is quintessentially an egalitarian, populist,
antistatist institution.”).
15. See John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579
(1984).
16. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1277, 1284  (1993) (“The Court’s willingness to endorse, in the name of de-
mocracy, any legislative burden imposed on the poor has handed the elected branches
a carte blanche to deal with a politically dispossessed minority.”).  Constitutional doc-
trine on this point has not changed since Loffredo wrote in 1993.
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1. Due Process and the Poor
Commentators associate a “due process paradigm” with many
aspects of procedural justice: access to the courts, government ac-
countability, and individual fairness.17  Consistent with a due pro-
cess perspective, the Casebook asks the students: “What is the test
of a good system of procedure?  One answer is: Does it tend to lead
to the just and efficient determination of legal controversies?”18  In-
troducing issues of poverty and inequality into the discussion al-
lows students to evaluate the governing paradigm and to consider
ways in which it might be adapted in light of social conditions.
Wealth clearly affects a litigant’s ability to access the civil justice
system, to prosecute or to defend claims, and to leverage the courts
for political expression.  Because due process is a flexible doctrine
that looks to all facts and circumstances, doctrinal space exists for
considering the effects of wealth disparities on the civil justice sys-
tem and for taking positive steps to remove barriers to court ac-
cess.  Looking at the Court’s due process cases from almost forty
years ago,19 commentators thought they saw a trend toward giving
“even the economically weaker party . . . a real, rather than a
merely illusory, opportunity to be heard”20—what Hans Smit
called “a potentially revolutionary development.”21  That develop-
ment proved to be stillborn: the Court’s approach to the Due Pro-
17. See, e.g., BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK, TONI M. MASSARO, & NORMAN W.
SPAULDING, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 1 (3d ed. 2006) (“Due pro-
cess, both as aspiration and method, is at the heart of our study of procedure.”); see
also Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Liti-
gation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition
of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2005) (explaining that litigation
involves multiple purposes, including helping to achieve “democratically chosen ends
of equality, dignity, autonomy and fundamental fairness”).
18. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 3.  Samuel Is- R
sacharoff explicitly links this question to the Due Process Clause:
Despite their different origins and forms, the constitutional command of due
process and the specific rule applications of civil procedure not only embody
many of the same objectives, they turn out to use the same tools.  Both are
placeholders for an animating conception of fairness that stands behind any
system of process.
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (2005).
19. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 70 (1972); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 221. R
20. Mauro Cappelletti, Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation:
Comparative Constitutional, International, and Social Trends, 25 STAN. L. REV. 651,
689 (1973).
21. Id. at 689 (citing FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL LITI-
GATION 790 (M. Cappelletti & D. Tallon eds., 1973) (quoting statement by Hans
Smit)).
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cess Clause typically ignores the adverse effects of wealth.  Instead,
in determining what process is “due” in any particular case, the
Court is guided by a principle of proportionality that seeks to bal-
ance three separate factors to reach an efficient result:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail.22
The Court’s emphasis on cost-benefit analysis arguably comes at
the expense of other aims and purposes23—what Frank I.
Michelman calls “dignity values, participation values, deterrence
values, and . . . effectuation values.”24  For some commentators, the
Court’s singular emphasis on efficiency undermines democratic
principles and negatively affects the interests of under-resourced
claimants.25
Students may be surprised to learn that the Court does not typi-
cally apply the Due Process Clause to remedy the adverse effects
of poverty on the administration of civil justice.  For example, the
Court has upheld filing fees that prevent a party from petitioning
for bankruptcy26 or from seeking review of an adverse welfare de-
cision,27 striking down court-imposed fees only when they prevent
the dissolution of marriage28 or bar review of a court determination
of parental unfitness.29  Moreover, the Due Process Clause has not
22. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 241 n.1. R
23. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 321 (2004)
(referring to accuracy and participation as values that inform procedural justice); see
also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 3-4 n.1; Graham, supra R
note 6, at 944 (positing that instrumentalism “permits the claim that procedure is sim- R
ply a value-free technique for reaching ends that are beyond the domain of procedure
and thus need not concern the proceduralist”).
24. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right
to Protect One’s Rights-Part I, 1973, DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172-77.
25. See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible
Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 349 (1990) (suggesting that an
emphasis on efficiency threatens democratic values and minority rights).
26. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 448-49 (1973).
27. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659-61 (1973).
28. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (finding a due process
violation on the ground that the state monopolizes all processes aimed at the creation
or dissolution of marriage).
29. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996).
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been read to require the assignment of counsel to indigent defend-
ants other than when “the litigant may lose his physical liberty
. . . .”30  As one commentator warns: “Increasingly, due process is
returning to its individualist roots—protecting those who have
property from losing it, but failing to protect those who do not
have property as it is traditionally defined.”31
2. Equal Protection and Wealth Disparities
The requirement of equal protection likewise provides opportu-
nities for discussing the effect of wealth disparities on the opera-
tion of civil procedure.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg observes:
“Equal Justice Under Law” is etched about the U.S. Supreme
Court’s grand entrance.  It is an ideal that remains aspirational.
Thanks in part to efforts by lawyers, race, gender, and other in-
cidents of birth no longer bar access to justice as they once did.
It remains true, however, that the poor, and even the middle
class, encounter financial impediments to a day in court.  They
do not enjoy the secure access available to those with full purses
or political muscle.32
Inequality as an economic term embraces a variety of concepts
that point to different constitutional concerns.  Some commenta-
tors equate inequality with impoverishment and focus on the ways
in which resource insufficiency might bar or impede a poor person
from participating in the market, in politics, and in court.33  For
others, inequality refers to income differences that distort demo-
cratic life by generating comparative advantages for the wealthy.34
30. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 25, 32 (1981)
(remitting to the trial court’s discretion “the decision whether due process calls for the
appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings” as depend-
ing on the specific facts of each case).
31. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process
Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9, 14 (1997).
32. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good:  Access to Justice in the
United States, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2001); see also Robert Hornstein, Daniel
G. Atkins, & Treena A. Kaye, The Politics of Equal Justice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1089, 1090 (2003) (“That the need for equal justice remains unmet
for millions of poor Americans cannot seriously be refuted.”).
33. See, e.g., Susan R. Jones, Abolishing Poverty in Our Lifetime, 15 J. AFFORDA-
BLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 164, 165 (2006) (discussing impoverishment as
a “trap” that produces “vulnerability, powerlessness, and lack of access to markets”).
34. See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger, Inequality, Too Much of a Good Thing, in INE-
QUALITY IN AMERICA: WHAT ROLE FOR HUMAN CAPITAL POLICIES? 1, 11-20 (James
Heckman & Alan B. Krueger eds., 2003) (providing reasons “for U.S. public policy to
try to restore a more balanced distribution of income in the country”).
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As with due process, equal protection in the procedural context
stands for a number of discrete but overlapping concerns: the pro-
vision of formal opportunities to access the courts; the availability
of resources needed to make meaningful use of the adjudicative
system; and the need for consistency in the decisions of judges and
other legal decision-makers.35  Disparate or inadequate resources
impact a party’s competitive position relative to an opponent.36
They also may make it impossible to hurdle state-imposed filing
fees, to retain a lawyer, or otherwise to access the civil justice sys-
tem.37  The phenomenon of “repeat players” in the court system
creates still other troublesome concerns.38  Yet even during the
heyday of the Warren Court, the Equal Protection Clause was
rarely deployed to remediate problems of inequality in the civil liti-
gation setting;39 the Court’s use of rationality review is famously
fatal to any claim of unconstitutionality regarding economic classi-
fication.40  With rare exceptions, constitutional doctrine thus em-
braces rule formalism, criticized by some as “a legal equality that
conceals practical domination.”41  Consistent with this view, proce-
dural rules that exclude, burden, or otherwise disadvantage indi-
viduals on the basis of wealth are accepted as constitutional,
35. See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1867-68 (2002) [hereinafter Rubenstein, The Concept of
Equality] (referring to “equipage equality,” “rule equality,” and “outcome equality”).
Bruce L. Hay earlier referred to concepts akin to rule equality and outcome equality
as “sorting effects” and “process effects.” See Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex
Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1806 (1997).
36. Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Asser-
tions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2087 (1989) [hereinafter Carrington, Making Rules] (“A
stronger party can gain a great advantage particularly if the adversary has few re-
sources to invest in the dispute.  ‘[M]ight,’ as Dickens had it, has the means of ‘weary-
ing out the right.’” (quoting CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 2 (1956))).
37. See Kenneth Einar Himma, Towards a Theory of Legitimate Access: Morally
Legitimate Authority and the Right of Citizens to Access the Civil Justice System, 79
WASH. L. REV. 31, 32 (2004) (presenting a general theory of access to the civil justice
system); see also John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L.
REV. 361 (1923) (discussing financial barriers to court access).
38. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98-104 (1974) (enumerating the advan-
tages that accrue to repeat players in litigation).
39. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1461-63 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing cases dealing with equal access to litigation opportunities).
40. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1136-37 (1999) (discussing fed-
eral rationality review).
41. Peter Gabel, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 302, 315 (1977).
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despite the practical denial of equal access or equal outcomes.42
By introducing issues of poverty and inequality into the discussion,
students can better explore the differing conceptions of equality
that motivate procedural justice and the ways in which the current
system conforms or diverges from a principle of “equality before
the law.”43
3. Association, Expression, and the Poor
The First Amendment embraces rights of speech and association
that potentially inform the design of civil procedure rules.  The
First Amendment values support private as well as public well-be-
ing: “individual self-fulfillment,” “attainment of truth,” “securing
participation by the members of the society in social, including po-
litical, decision-making,” and “maintaining the balance between
stability and change in the society.”44  As Justice Harlan has ex-
plained, litigation is a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment that includes not only the right “to advocate,” but
also the right to join with others “in an effort to make that advo-
cacy effective” and “to join together for purposes of obtaining judi-
cial redress.”45  However, the standard metaphor for the First
Amendment—the “marketplace of ideas”46—tends to ignore the
effects of poverty on the enjoyment of expressive rights.47  One
commentator observes, “[i]n the marketplace . . . ‘money talks.’
No model has replaced this one in the United States, and, in fact, in
contrast to other liberal, capitalist, and democratic societies in Eu-
rope, the power of free speech has increasingly been used to pro-
42. See Richard L. Abel, Big Lies and Small Steps: A Critique of Deborah Rhode’s
Too Much Law, Too Little Justice:  Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1019, 1024 (1998) (stating that proponents of liberal theory are “sur-
prised that formal equality before the law, symbolized by blindfolded justice, does not
translate into equal access or outcomes”).
43. Cappelletti, supra note 20, at 689. R
44. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L. J. 877, 878-79 (1963).
45. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 452-53 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (inter-
nal citations omitted).
46. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., con-
curring). But see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973)
(“The ‘marketplace of ideas’ is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative
tools.”).
47. See Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amend-
ment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 898 (1991) (suggesting that the
inexact fit between begging and First Amendment values “stems from an insufficient
regard for the economic constraints on the ways in which the poor can and do express
themselves”).
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tect those individuals and corporations already strongest in our
society.”48  Students can be asked to consider the ways in which the
Court’s hands-off approach to wealth in the First Amendment con-
text affects the adjudicative process and shapes the role of litiga-
tion in democratic life.
B. Adversarialism, Transsubstantivity, and Litigant Capacity
Poverty and inequality also provide an important perspective
from which to examine two key non-constitutional features of
United States procedure: adversarialism and transsubstantivity.
The Casebook puts the adversary model front and center.  Students
read on the first page: “Civil disputes in the United States are
largely resolved by courts according to adversarial principles of jus-
tice—the idea that individual litigants should have autonomy in
shaping lawsuits and in moving claims to their ultimate resolu-
tion.”49  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure feature transsub-
stantivity as a guiding principle.  Federal Rule 1 establishes that the
rules “govern the procedure in the United States district courts in
all suits of a civil nature,” and Federal Rule 2 further establishes
“one form of action to be known as ‘civil action.’”50  Nevertheless,
the principle of transsubstantivity draws fire from critics, such as
William N. Eskridge, Jr., who insist that procedural rules “ought
not always be transsubstantive, but . . . [rather] must be tailored to
different types of litigation.”51
1. Adversarialism and Litigant Capacity
The adversary system—called the “American approach to adju-
dication”52—assumes “that out of the sharp clash of proofs
presented by adversaries in a highly structured forensic setting is
most likely to come the information upon which a neutral and pas-
48. David Abraham, Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in
a “Negative Citizenship” Regime, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 60-61 (1996).
49. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 1. R
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added); FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
51. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 949 (1989).  By
contrast to the federal system, many state systems include courts of limited jurisdic-
tion with specialized procedural rules. See, e.g., DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRAC-
TICE 19 (4th ed. 1999) (explaining that the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act “is
profuse in procedural detail; thus, although the CPLR applies in the court, it is less
needed there than in the courts that try the usual civil actions”).
52. See generally STEPHAN LANDSMAN, ABA SECTION OF LITIG., READINGS ON
ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION (1988); see
also CHASE, supra note 14, at 47-71 (associating a distinct form of adversarial justice R
with “formal, official, American adjudication”).
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sive decision maker can base the resolution of a litigated dispute
acceptable to both the parties and society.”53  Commentators asso-
ciate the adversary system with values central to American legal
culture: individual autonomy, personal freedom, efficiency, and ac-
curate decision-making.54  The adversary model builds on a num-
ber of interlocking assumptions: that participants are rational,
competent actors; that disputants have access to resources in the
form of both dollars and power; that their attorneys’ interests
match their own; and that competition will lead to the truth.55
Above all, disputants are assumed to possess high levels of litiga-
tive capacity—what scholars since Frank I. Michelman have called
the “equipage” needed to participate fully in the adjudicative en-
terprise.56  Equipage includes resources to obtain counsel, to pay
filing fees, to hire experts, to develop electronic databases for dis-
covery, and the like.57  To these we might add educational levels
that allow an individual to understand the legal process, income
levels that afford sufficient time and wherewithal to devote to liti-
gation, and status levels that grant the confidence needed to chal-
lenge established norms or to defend one’s own actions.
Equipage inequality challenges the assumptions on which the ad-
versary system rests.  Marie A. Failinger and Larry May observe,
“the poor do not arrive before judicial tribunals on an equal foot-
ing with the non-poor adversaries they sometimes face.  This is es-
pecially true with regard to their obtaining competent and zealous
53. LANDSMAN, supra note 52, at 2. R
54. See STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA:
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 22-25 (2006).  Judith Resnik refers to the “etiquette”
of the civil justice system:
Civil litigants are free to find lawyers (or not) and then to make their way
through the adversarial processes as best they can, on their own.  These
premises are deeply entrenched within United States culture, generated
from the mix of capitalism, individualism, attorney entrepreneurialism, am-
bivalence about regulation, readings of constitutional text, history and hap-
penstance. Laissez-fair lawyering and unaided access are my shorthand.
Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
2119, 2130 (2000).
55. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 494, 513 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith].
56. Michelman, supra note 24, at 1163; see also Rubenstein, The Concept of Equal- R
ity, supra note 35, at 1867-68 (associating equipage equality with the adversary system R
and “the idea that . . . acceptable outcomes are produced by a . . . battle between
equally armed contestants”).
57. See Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality, supra note 35, at 1867-68 n.9. R
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legal representation.”58  As documented by many observers, in-
cluding the American Bar Association, individuals who are poor or
even middle class often lack essential litigant capacity;59 nor do pri-
vate or public resources adequately fill the gap.  Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg reports that “the U.S. record of legal assistance for
the less wealthy is decidedly mixed,” pointing to the fact that the
United States has “the highest concentration of lawyers in the
world [yet] meets less than 20% of the legal needs of its poor citi-
zens, and not two-thirds of the needs of its middle class.”  In addi-
tion, spending for legal services in the United States, she says,
compares disfavorably to that by other democratic nations.60  The
gap between the theory and practice of adversarial justice has
caused some commentators to criticize United States procedure as
“potentially unfair”:
As a system dependent on private lawyers for implementation,
the adversarial process can and does benefit wealthier litigants
who are able to afford more investigation and a more skilled
and also more expensive lawyer.  Those who cannot afford a
lawyer must represent themselves in court or utilize the increas-
ingly limited free legal services.61
The potential unfairness goes beyond the individual interests of af-
fected claimants.  Rather, wealth distinctions are said to undermine
the capacity for robust adversarial advocacy from which the adjudi-
cative process draws its authority and transformative power.62
58. Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services
and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 12 (1984).
59. See, e.g., Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice
in the United States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 83, 93
(2000).  The American Bar Association has identified serious gaps in the legal re-
sources available to the poor and even the middle class. See ABA, AGENDA FOR
ACCESS:  THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPLI-
CATIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(1996), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/agendafor
access.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
60. Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 10-11.  The English civil legal aid system, estab- R
lished in 1949, was effectively abolished in 1999. See NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL
PROCEDURE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 220 (2003).  Sup-
port for government-sponsored legal assistance has declined in other industrial coun-
tries as well. See id. at 221 (stating that “Sweden in 1997 decided that private legal
expenses insurance should be given priority over State support for civil claims
through legal aid”).
61. SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 54, at 24; see also Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note R
55, at 517 (“When gross imbalances are commonplace and patent, a belief in adver- R
sarialism has a hollow ring.”).
62. Daniel Markovitz, Adversary Advocacy and the Authority of Adjudication, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1390-92 (2006).
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Although the adversary model functions as a legitimating myth
in the United States, many commentators would agree that it no
longer descriptively maps federal procedure, which increasingly de-
pends on managerial judging63 and other practices associated with
civil law systems.64  Moreover, the adversary model invites criti-
cism as an anachronistic approach that is “obviously maladapted to
a modern, interdependent, flexible complex industrial system.”65
Integrating concerns of poverty and inequality into the analysis al-
lows students to develop a deeper understanding of the adversarial
process and its relation to contemporary demands.
2. Transsubstantivity and Economic Disparity
The principle of transsubstantivity holds that procedural rules
should be uniform regardless of the substance of the dispute, the
identities of the parties, and the social stakes for the public at
large.66  Some commentators see transsubstantivity as essential to
maintaining the neutrality and impartiality of civil process: the re-
quirement of generality removes procedural rulemaking from
politics and insulates civil procedure from special interest domina-
tion.67  Moreover, the requirement of transsubstantivity is said to
63. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 376-78 (1982).
64. See Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87
GEO. L.J. 1983, 1985 (1999) (arguing that in the area of mass litigation, the United
States justice system has slipped toward the “inquisitorial” model associated with civil
law countries).  Ellen E. Sward writes, “[a]dversarial adjudication is often defined in
tandem with its antithesis, inquisitorial adjudication.”  Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideol-
ogy and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 312 (1989).  The
formal boundary between the common law and civil law systems is open to question.
See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process,
and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1187
(2005) (“The models of adversarial and inquisitorial systems of justice are precisely
that—models to which no actual legal system precisely corresponds, since all legal
systems combine both adversarial and inquisitorial elements.”).
65. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000,
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19, 44 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro
Santos eds., 2006).
66. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 829 n.176 (1991) (explaining that
“[t]he accepted premise of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that they are rules
of general applicability, without regard to kinds of cases or litigants; thus, they tran-
scend particular substantive law applications”).
67. See Graham, supra note 6, at 945 (acknowledging the view that the “lack of R
uniformity is a threat to the claim that procedure is a value-free science”); see also
Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 36, at 2068 (concluding that “judicially-made R
rules directing courts to proceed differently according to the substantive nature of the
rights enforced is an idea that has been wisely rejected in the past and must be re-
jected for the present and for the future”).
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help facilitate social change by providing a shared “framework of
existing procedural norms” within which reform litigation can take
place.68  Others, however, criticize the fairness and efficiency of
transsubstantive rules.  Robert Cover famously observed:
It is by no means intuitively apparent that the procedural needs
of a complex antitrust action, a simple automobile negligence
case, a hard-fought school integration suit, and an environmen-
tal class action to restrain the building of a pipeline are suffi-
ciently identical to be usefully encompassed in a single set of
rules which makes virtually no distinctions among such cases in
terms of available process.69
Whether transsubstantivity any longer describes United States
procedure can be questioned, given such developments as “a bewil-
dering array of local rules, standing orders, and standard operating
procedures,”70 as well as privately negotiated contract provisions
that alter the terms of public procedural codes.71  Carl Tobias thus
posits that the reality of federal procedure “is rapidly undermining
the theory that the Federal Rules are transsubstantive,” while the
practice of legal scholarship is “increasingly discredit[ing] the re-
lated idea that procedure can be applied without fully considering
its substantive impacts on particular rights or specific groups.”72
Pointing to the decline in transsubstantivity, some commentators
suggest the need to establish special procedures for cases involving
the poor—whether alternative dispute resolution, small claims
courts, or streamlined procedures—in order to reduce cost and to
ensure the quality of decision-making.73  Already, the Eastern Dis-
68. Hazard, supra note 5, at 2247. R
69. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732-33 (1975).
70. Stephen P. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 (1988).
71. See David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convo-
luted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional
Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1103 (2002) (arguing that the judicial enforcement
of pre-litigation agreements “that vary established judicial procedures defeats the
goal of uniformity by allowing for privately tailored procedure for individual suits”).
72. Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1501, 1508 (1992); see also Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1280-85 (1997) (associating
procedural change and local variation with the end of the New Deal consensus).
73. Compare Mark C. Weber, The Federal Civil Rules Amendments of 1993 and
Complex Litigation: A Comment on Transsubstantivity and Special Rules for Large
and Small Federal Cases, 14 REV. LITIG. 113, 130 (1994) (suggesting “that special rules
for smaller cases might be the reform of choice”), with Robert E. Rains, A Specialized
Court for Social Security? A Critique of Recent Proposals, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 24
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trict of New York assigns a specific magistrate judge to handle
cases filed in forma pauperis.74  Although justified by the prospect
of efficiency and expertise,75 rules that channel poor people’s
claims to specialist courts or to assigned judges could distort deci-
sion-making or give the appearance of second-class justice.76
Questions of institutional design thus provide an important win-
dow into the idea of transsubstantivity and whether procedural
rules ought to adjust for wealth.
II. SELECTED CIVIL PROCEDURE TOPICS AND CONCERNS OF
CLASS AND POVERTY LAW
The preceding Part highlights procedural themes that can be
more critically understood from a perspective of poverty and ine-
quality.  This Part connects these themes to selected doctrinal areas
that typically are covered in the basic course and that can be used
to explore the animating concepts.  The examples are drawn from
the Casebook and are intended merely to illustrate and not to ex-
haust the field.  Many important topics are not covered, such as the
financing of civil litigation, the structure of the legal profession,
and the Erie doctrine.77  Although there is no standard civil proce-
(1987) (criticizing a proposal to establish a Social Security Court as a smokescreen for
the desire to develop pro-government precedent).
74. See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the
Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475 (2002) (describing
the Eastern District of New York’s approach to pro se cases).
75. Id. at 497, 499-500 (“The Eastern District of New York’s model for managing
pro se litigation uses the tools of centralization and specialization in an effort to pro-
mote the fair and efficient processing of claims by unrepresented litigants.”).
76. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV.
377, 439 (raising and responding to concerns about specialist courts).
77. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  To these topics one might
add the rules enactment process, which fits comfortably in an introduction to the
course or as part of the unit on the Erie doctrine.  As Stephen N. Subrin and Margaret
Y.K. Woo observe,
[W]hen the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure finally became law it was the
result of a liberal, Democratic, New Deal mentality; many of the new rights
were made possible by a Democratic controlled Congress and a liberal Su-
preme Court.  In some ways, the backlash has been the opposite, partially
the result of laissez-faire, conservative, Republican political powers that seek
smaller government and less litigation.
SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 54, at 56.  Currently, some commentators criticize the R
rule-making process for affording insufficient attention to lay interests and for
privileging elite legal views. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 611 (5th ed. 2003) (summarizing
criticisms).  By locating the federal rules in their explicit political context—the rule-
making process itself—students are in a better analytic position to assess the struc-
tural biases that these rules might reflect. See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on
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dure curriculum, these choices reflect fairly recurring practices in
first-year courses.78
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Students often find personal jurisdiction doctrine to be obscure
or impenetrable.  The Court’s approach to personal jurisprudence,
built on the Due Process Clause, asks whether a defendant’s con-
tacts with the forum state justify the exercise of adjudicatory au-
thority.79  I raise here two doctrinal issues: how to treat a contract
between an out-of-state and an in-state resident for purposes of
minimum contacts analysis; and the significance of forum-selection
clauses in routine consumer contracts.  Discussing the Court’s ap-
proach from the perspective of poverty or inequality frames the
material in a provocative and interesting way that also highlights
structural biases in the doctrine.
Burger King, a staple case of the first-year curriculum, focuses
on whether a commercial contract in a dispute involving a long-
term franchise relationship creates a “substantial connection” be-
tween a non-resident defendant and the forum state as to justify
the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.80  Justice Stevens, in
dissent, found “a significant element of unfairness in requiring a
franchisee to defend a case [involving a dispute about a franchise
agreement] in the forum chosen by the franchisor,” emphasizing
the disparity in resources between plaintiff and defendant and the
lack of notice provided by a boiler-plate forum provision that left
defendant “financially unprepared” for litigation in a court outside
his home state.81
the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924,
1925 (2006) (“Because avowedly procedural rules may have either substantive pur-
poses or substantive effects, consideration should be given to the political legitimacy
of the process by which they are formulated or applied and of the actors who are
formulating or applying them.”).
78. See Paul D. Carrington, Teaching Civil Procedure: A Retrospective View, 49 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 311, 312 (1999) (questioning whether there is a “traditional curricu-
lum” in civil procedure).
79. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 76, 78 (stating that due process requires that R
“in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he must have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice”) (internal citations omitted).
80. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 108. R
81. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 114-15. R
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Some analysts read Justice Brennan’s majority opinion as al-
lowing for the exercise of jurisdiction even if the contract involves
modest financial stakes or represents the defendant’s only physical
contact with the state.82  One commentator warns:
Of continuing concern is the scenario raised by the court of ap-
peals in Burger King and underlying the buyer/seller cases.  The
court of appeals argued that allowing jurisdiction over the de-
fendants in Burger King would also allow the exercise of juris-
diction over “out-of-state consumers to collect payments due on
modest personal purchases” and “sow the seeds of default judg-
ments against franchisees owing smaller debts.”  One wonders
whether Sears, Roebuck and Company can gain jurisdiction in
the northern district of Illinois over its nonresident consumer
buyers who have a revolving charge account with the company
and who contemplate a long-term relationship with Sears, and
whether Sears can strengthen its case merely by including
choice-of-law language in its contractual agreements with such
customers.  The Court’s answer to this concern was only that it
was not adopting a per se rule . . . .83
Although the minimum contacts test is highly fact specific, Burger
King raises concerns that the Court’s approach more generally af-
fects forum location in consumer credit disputes between lesser
resourced individuals and corporations.
The emergence of “Contract Procedure,”84 especially the in-
creasing trend toward choice-of-forum clauses in small stakes con-
sumer contracts,85 potentially further exacerbates the jurisdictional
difficulties that under-resourced individuals face.  Choice-of-forum
clauses translate into important litigation advantages for the corpo-
rate party that typically drafts the provision.  The consumer finds
herself having to defend or to initiate a claim in a distant forum at
great expense and inconvenience, and during settlement talks pre-
82. See Duncan E. Barber, Minimum Contacts in Single Contract Cases: Burger
King Has Its Way, 1986 BYU L. REV. 505, 509 (1986).
83. Pamela J. Stephens, The Single Contract As Minimum Contacts: Justice Bren-
nan “Has It His Way,” 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 89, 111 (1986) (internal citations
omitted).
84. See Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 10, at 598 (using “the word R
‘contract’ . . . to refer both to government-based encouragement of dispute resolution
through contract and to government enforcement of parties’ agreements to contract
out of litigation”).
85. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Market for Contracts 8-9
(New York Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 06-45, 2007), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=938557.
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dictably faces a discount in the value of her claims.86  As Linda
Mullenix comments:
Forum-selection clauses radically change and upset the tradi-
tional calculus of personal jurisdiction by shifting the forum ad-
vantage in favor of defendants.  Here, the usual personal
jurisdiction dilemma is reversed: these provisions enable the de-
fendant to hale an unwilling and unsuspecting plaintiff into a
distant, foreign forum (or forfeit the plaintiff’s cause of action).
Yet, because personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has always been
defendant-oriented, even to the exclusion of the plaintiff’s role
in the litigation, no due process rights or review attach to the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a plaintiff.87
Commentators frequently justify the privatization of procedure on
grounds of efficiency and autonomy, without regard to their distri-
butional consequences.88  Introducing concerns of poverty and ine-
quality into the discussion allows for a more critical examination of
this important trend.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Students sometimes perceive the topic of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, especially the federal grants of diversity and of “arising
under” jurisdiction, to be arcane, confusing and of merely technical
significance.89  Every litigator knows, however, that the decision to
sue in federal or state court can generate dispositive effects.
“Choice of forum can mean joyous victory or depressing defeat.  A
wrong selection and it’s enemy territory: a jurisdiction where the
prevailing law, available remedies, courtroom procedures, and ju-
ror attitudes are inimical to your client.”90  The formal distinctions
between state and federal court systems are familiar: “Federal
judges enjoy life tenure and sit with juries selected from a broader
86. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography As a Litigation Weapon: Consumers,
Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 455 (1992).
87. Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise
Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 363 (1992).
88. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 447
(2004) (arguing that if parties to a contract both agree to have a private system re-
solve contractual problems that may arise, “it must make each of them better off”);
Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 51-52 (1992) (positing the desirability, despite rights-based
criticisms, of enforcing forum-selection clauses).
89. See Georgene Vairo, Foreword, Forum Selection Development Symposium, 37
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1393, 1400 (2004) (stating that “it is well-known that the law of
federal courts and jurisdiction is quite confusing and difficult to understand”).
90. Gita F. Rothschild, Forum Shopping, 24 LITIG. 40, 40 (Spring 1998).
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geographical area than most state tribunals.  Most importantly, fed-
eral judges are appointed; since many state judges are elected, state
judges are thought to be more susceptible to political pressure and
local biases than federal judges.”91  Commentators from Justice
Story to Burt Neuborne have questioned whether the state courts
enjoy parity with those of the Article III system and, if not, the
ideological valence of any structural biases.92
Whether to proceed in state or in federal court can be a question
of particular importance to indigent individuals.  Even at this early
stage in their legal education, students can profitably discuss how
differences in appointment processes, jury pools, government re-
sources, and caseload pressures might be expected to affect judicial
decision-making on issues concerning the poor.  They also can con-
sider whether structural differences between the state and federal
courts may translate into discrete but consistent ideological differ-
ences in judicial decision-making, or whether the question of parity
is in fact contingent and dependent on historical context.93  Finally,
students can consider the policy choice of maintaining the federal
courts as a small elite corps and the possible implications of this
decision for the poor.94
91. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 252. R
92. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the
Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001) (discussing, in part, differences be-
tween state and federal courts that might structurally affect the adjudication of claims
involving the poor).
93. See William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
599, 600 (1999) (asking whether the civil rights bar’s earlier preferences for Article III
courts “simply reflect short term trends”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Recon-
sidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 236 (1988)
(“I fear that the debate over parity is permanently stalemated because parity is an
empirical question—whether one court system is as good as another—for which there
never can be any meaningful empirical measure.”).
94. Paul D. Carrington asks, as part of a provocative dialogue about “class strug-
gle in civil procedure”:
Is it not true that the federal judges would not like to have their jurisdiction
extended to include all the humdrum matters that are now in state courts
because it would deprive them of their elite status to become involved in
such routine?  Why their whole claim to class authority would be lost if their
precious federal commission were shared with the people who presently staff
the state courts.  It is snobbery that sustains the limitations on federal
jurisdiction.
. . .
The federal courts are just the flagship of the national elite of the bar, as
they gradually diminish the power of local lawyers and local judges, while
making it appear that they are so solicitous of local prerogatives.
Paul D. Carrington, Class Struggle in Civil Procedure: A Dialogue 13, 34-35 (unpub-
lished and undated manuscript, on file with author).
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Turning to the scope of federal jurisdiction, the Court’s approach
to “arising under” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331—as set out
in Merrell Dow,95 Grable,96 and Empire HealthChoice97—looks, in
part, to the nature of the federal interest at stake in the dispute and
whether that interest is sufficiently important or substantial to war-
rant provision of a federal forum.  Over time, the Court has shaped
“arising under” jurisdiction in order to protect national markets
and to support regulatory uniformity.98  By contrast, at least since
the end of the Warren Court, federal jurisdiction has not been
thought necessary to protect the poor or to encourage civil rights
enforcement.  To the contrary, as Matthew Diller observes:
[T]he federal courts have become inhospitable to claims of poor
people.  Poverty litigators in federal court are confronted with a
battery of jurisdictional and other technical defenses, the judici-
ary’s deference to administrative agencies, and a judiciary ap-
pointed by Republican presidents committed to making sure
that the judicial activism of the 1960s does not recur.99
The role of the federal courts in protecting the poor thus provides
important insight into the appropriate reach of § 1331 jurisdiction.
Diversity jurisdiction also can be better understood from the
perspective of wealth and poverty.  Conventional wisdom associ-
ates diversity jurisdiction with the need to protect out-of-state re-
95. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 806 n.2 (1986) (“Several
commentators have suggested that our § 1331 decisions can best be understood as an
evaluation of the nature of the federal interest at stake.”); see also id. at 814 n.12;
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 284 n.12. R
96. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313
(2005); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON, & HELEN
HERSHKOFF, 2006 CIVIL PROCEDURE SUPPLEMENT FOR USE WITH ALL PLEADING
AND PROCEDURE CASEBOOKS 506, 509 [hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., 2006 SUP-
PLEMENT] (“It has in fact become a constant refrain in such cases that federal jurisdic-
tion demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a
serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal
forum.”).
97. Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121, 2137
(2006); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., 2006 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 96, at 477, 484 (charac- R
terizing the claim in Grable as one in which the federal “question qualified as
‘substantial’”).
98. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federaliza-
tion, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1356 (2006) (arguing that the Court’s recent § 1331
decisions seek to “capture the considerable benefits that flow from national regula-
tory uniformity and to protect an increasingly unified national (and international)
commercial market from the imposition of externalities by unfriendly state
legislation”).
99. Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1401,
1420 (1995).
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sidents against in-state bias; the literature also emphasizes the
historic aim of protecting creditors against populist state judges
and pro-debtor rules.100  Congress’ decision to shift multi-state
class actions into the federal courts, despite the absence of com-
plete diversity between the plaintiffs and the defendants, recasts
this set of issues in an important and contemporary context that
potentially pits large corporations against tort plaintiffs who may
be relatively under-resourced.101  As during the Lochner period,
some commentators criticize extending a federal forum because it
arguably advantages big business at the expense of financially weak
plaintiffs.102  On the other hand, interstate class actions may be said
to deserve a federal forum “because they implicate interstate com-
merce, invite discrimination by states against outsiders, and tend to
cultivate bias against large business enterprises.”103  As with
§ 1331, the evolving nature of diversity jurisdiction reflects social
values that implicate the accessibility of federal courts for claim-
ants with limited financial resources.  The Casebook invites stu-
dents to consider what types of cases should be heard in the federal
courts.104  The answer to that question surely involves some consid-
eration of whether federal courts have a significant role to play in
resolving legal questions that touch on poverty and inequality.105
100. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 249-51 (summa- R
rizing the literature).
101. For a summary of recent legislation, see Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Class Ac-
tion Jurisdiction After CAFA, Exxon Mobil and Grable, 8 DEL. L. REV. 157 (2006).
102. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges,
Politics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21, 27-32
(Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004); see also Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical
Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973, 992 (2005) (positing that “[i]n
the first decade of the twentieth century . . . the Plessy Court . . . was often a tool of
big business and the ‘moneyed classes’”); JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex
Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717,
718 (2004) (criticizing the extension of a federal forum to multi-state state law tort
class actions).
103. Victor Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should
Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction
Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 486 (2000); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 253. R
104. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 280 n.4. R
105. In this context, the students might consider this comment by Edward A. Pur-
cell, Jr.:
If the question of jurisdictional limitation requires us to make political judg-
ments, then the fundamental question is not what cases should be taken
from the federal courts but what cases are most essential to send to them. . . .
I suggest that the best answer for the present and foreseeable future is that
the federal courts should concentrate on those important cases where there
is a drastic inequality of social resources between the parties, where ordinary
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C. Notice and the Opportunity to be Heard
Many civil procedure courses also include some coverage of the
leading “notice and opportunity to be heard” cases.106  Early due
process decisions of the Warren Court involved poor people or
workers who found their possessions or salary taken by court order
before any hearing on the merits was even scheduled.107  Kevin R.
Johnson observes:
A case evaluating the constitutionality of a Florida prejudgment
remedy law, Fuentes v. Shevin, an early decision in the line of
cases leading up to Connecticut v. Doehr, allows the class to im-
agine what it would be like for Margarita Fuentes—a poor La-
tina, disadvantaged in multiple ways—to have a sheriff barge
into her home to repossess a stove and stereo purchased on the
installment plan.  It calls forth a discussion of how issues of race,
class, and gender intersect in U.S. society.  Importantly, Fuentes
may not have been a deadbeat who would or could not pay her
bills; she paid her installments until a dispute arose over the ser-
vicing of the stove.108
“Notice” cases also potentially involve the interests of the poor.
Some attention can be paid to the rules of service of process and
how they have been adapted to protect poor litigants against the
abuse of “sewer” service, used to trigger default judgments based
individuals confront centers of institutionalized power and wealth. Such
cases would include, preeminently, cases where individuals confront the
power of government and government officials, especially those of the
states, in cases under the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
national civil rights laws. It would also include cases—even cases based on
diversity of citizenship—where private individuals confront the power of na-
tional corporations in actions where the stakes of the suit or the conditions
of its litigation are such that the corporate parties have particular opportuni-
ties or special incentives to utilize the vast and unequal social resources they
command.
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Caseload Burdens and Jurisdictional Limitations: Some Obser-
vations from the History of the Federal Courts, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 7, 25 (2002-
2003).
106. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) (opportunity to be heard);
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice).
107. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 70 (1972); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 221 (“Firestone instituted an action in small-claims R
court for repossession of both the stove and the stereo, claiming that Mrs. Fuentes
had refused to make her remaining payments.  Simultaneously with the filing of that
action and before Mrs. Fuentes had even received a summons to answer its complaint,
Firestone obtained a writ of replevin ordering a sheriff to seize the disputed goods at
once.”).
108. Johnson, supra note 2, at 249-50. R
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on false affidavits of service.109  Another important issue concerns
the effectiveness of notice and whether the recipient’s special cir-
cumstances—poverty, mental disability, or imprisonment—count
in the due process calculus.  The Casebook asks the students to
consider what method of notice is reasonable “when the govern-
ment needs to contact homeless individuals who lack a permanent
residence or a fixed address.”110  This unit in the Casebook closes
with a discussion of the values that the due process notice require-
ment is intended to serve: concerns of poverty and inequality illu-
minate this issue in important ways.111
D. Joinder and Class Actions
Not all first-year civil procedure courses, especially those that
are only four credit hours, have time to devote to joinder rules and
class actions.  Courses that cover these topics, however, can mean-
ingfully explore how procedural design impairs or facilitates the
vindication of rights of under-resourced litigants.  The class action
device, which authorizes group litigation on a theory of interest
representation, highlights the importance of procedure as a way to
effectuate specific substantive norms that might otherwise go unen-
forced.112  Over time, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 has
played a critical role in enabling indigent individuals who “are in a
poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do not
know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expen-
sive,”113 to seek judicial relief.  For at least the last decade, how-
ever, Congress has limited the right of poor people to use the class
action to mount constitutional and other legal challenges.114  In
particular, lawyers whose work is funded in whole or in part by the
Legal Services Corporation are barred from representing indigent
clients in class action litigation.115  The exclusion of a category of
109. See generally United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 212. R
110. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 194 n.10. R
111. Id. at 195 n.12.
112. See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking
the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 75
(calling Rule 23 “inherently ‘transsubstantive’”).
113. Harry Kalven & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCE-
DURE, supra note 9, at 660-61. R
114. See John Leubsdorf, Class Actions at the Cloverleaf, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 455
(1997).
115. See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 664; R
Ilisabeth Smith Bornstein, From the Viewpoint of the Poor: An Analysis of the Consti-
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litigants from an important procedural opportunity raises signifi-
cant questions for discussion.
E. Pleading, Motions to Dismiss, Discovery, and
Summary Judgment
Some procedure courses open with the topic of pleading and mo-
tions to dismiss; others begin with the study of jurisdiction and the
Erie doctrine.  At either stage in the course, integrating the per-
spective of poverty and inequality will enhance critical understand-
ing of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The drafters of the
Rules did not explicitly consider the effect of impoverishment on
the practice of litigation.116  Nevertheless, the decision to adopt a
regime of notice pleading was intended “to focus litigation on the
merits of a claim”117 and “to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits.”118  Simplified pleading is presumed to have an equalizing
effect on judicial access in cases involving under-resourced liti-
gants.119  As Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., explains:
The Federal Rules have been an effective instrument of social
justice because they reduce the barriers to the formulation and
proof of claims against the existing systems of authority.  Formu-
lation of new theories of legal rights is simpler, virtually by defi-
nition, under a pleading system that is not constructed in terms
of old legal categories, as was code pleading and common law
pleading.  Proof of new theories of liability likewise is simpler
with the aid of comprehensive discovery.120
Notice pleading “[n]ot only . . . check[s] the consequences of at-
torney disparities, . . . [it] also facilitates the pursuit of certain law-
suits, cases that are primarily prosecuted by less advantaged parties
against those with greater resources.”121  Admittedly, some com-
tutionality of the Restriction on Class Action Involvement by Legal Services Attorneys,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 693.
116. See Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 55, at 513-14 (observing that the drafters R
did “not speak of the individuals . . . without resources who lack attorneys”).
117. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 519. R
118. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48
(1957)). But see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. —, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)
(urging as “best forgotten” the Conley pleading standard that a complaint should not
be dismissed unless “‘the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief’”) (internal citations omitted).
119. See Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality, supra note 35, at 1879. R
120. Hazard, supra note 5, at 2246 (internal citations omitted).
121. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality, supra note 35, at 1879-80 (citing JAMES R
FLEMING, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 140 (4th ed. 1992), who references
tort claims, toxic tort claims, and products liability claims).
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mentators offer less cheerful assessments of notice pleading.  Even
in a simple case—“‘ordinary,’ ‘routine,’ ‘run of the mine,’ ‘garden
variety’ (pick your metaphor),” says Judith Resnik—an injured
person’s inability to secure legal advice may prevent a meritorious
claim from being presented to the court.122  Moreover, although
the Court has limited trial courts from using their discretion to im-
pose heightened pleading requirements outside of specific substan-
tive areas, it nevertheless has encouraged resort to “summary
judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious
claims sooner rather than later”123—trends that impact court ac-
cess.  In addition, the sanction power poses special difficulties for
certain types of claims—particularly civil rights claims—that the
poor might allege, such as challenges to regulatory classifications
or efforts to propose a change in existing law.  Although federal
judicial use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as a sanctioning
device has apparently declined since the 1993 amendments, at least
one analyst finds an increased number of sanctions imposed as a
matter of inherent judicial authority: “[c]ivil rights plaintiffs are
still targeted for Rule 11 sanctions more frequently than other liti-
gants in the federal courts, and they are actually sanctioned at a
much higher rate than any other category of litigant.”124  The effect
of pleading rules on judicial access for the poor provides an impor-
tant evaluative perspective on the current system of procedural
rules.
F. Trial by Jury
Trial by jury holds iconic status in procedural history.125  Civil
jury trials also are a lightning rod for public criticism.126
122. Bloom & Hershkoff, supra note 74, at 482-83 (citing Judith Resnik, Trial as R
Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 924, 969 (2000)).
123. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at R
520-21 n.2; see also Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litiga-
tion Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliche´s Eroding Our Day in Court
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1011 (2003).
124. Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years:  Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the
1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 576 n.5. R
125. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 894 (referring to R
“the revered status of jury trial at common law”).
126. Id. (summarizing Chief Justice Burger’s criticisms of the civil jury).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-4\FUJ404.txt unknown Seq: 26 18-SEP-07 10:50
1350 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
[B]ecause civil verdicts actually entail a reallocation of resources
within society, affect the availability and price of products and
services, and serve as a ‘yardstick’ for negotiated outcomes in
civil litigation, civil jury decisions have a broader impact [than
criminal jury decisions] and can motivate political counterat-
tacks by threatened interests.127
Concerns about the jury typically relate to its representativeness
of the community, its competence to assess complex factual ques-
tions, and its efficiency as a lay decision-maker.  Juror
demographics affect the analysis; empirical studies focus on the ef-
fect of race and wealth on juror performance and jury outcomes.
Theodore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells observe: “Lawyers have
definite views about the relationship between demographics and
juror performance.  Race, income level, and urbanization are
thought to relate to juror behavior.”128  They add that the view that
“jurors’ demographic characteristics substantially influence case
outcomes . . . suggests that the merits of cases are subservient to
the personal characteristics of jurors”—an idea that threatens the
integrity of the legal system.129  Their research suggests that pov-
erty levels, at least in state courts, affect the size of tort awards,
although “poverty is likely not the only factor at work.”130  By in-
troducing concerns of poverty and inequality, the class can more
critically understand public attitudes toward the jury.
G. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Civil procedure courses often include some discussion of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.  These doctrines generate complex
consequences in administrative challenges to the denial of govern-
ment benefits.  Administrative Law Judges typically make initial
determinations in such cases, and their decisions may have legal or
127. Christopher E. Smith, Imagery, Politics, and Jury Reform, 28 AKRON L. REV.
77, 87 (1994).
128. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Is
There a Bronx Effect?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1840 (2002).
129. Id. at 1842.
130. Id. at 1869; see also Michael J. Saks, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Easy
Assumptions Versus Hard Evidence, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1877, 1885 (2002) (“[I]f one
thinks that the ‘Bronx effect’ is that communities with more poor and minority re-
sidents—regardless of who serves on the juries in those communities—will be more
sympathetic and generous to plaintiffs, that is a hypothesis that Eisenberg and Wells’s
data can and do test.”); cf. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, and
American Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 51-52
(2003) (“The results indicate that awards fall (or increase only moderately in the fed-
eral data) with white poverty rates but increase dramatically with black poverty
rates.”).
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factual consequences that a poor person does not expect.131  The
threat of preclusion is heightened in cases in which the claimant is
not represented.  Jon C. Dubin has written extensively on this issue
with respect to federal disability benefits, emphasizing the special
difficulties that pro se litigants face in avoiding the loss of federal
claims that could have been, but were not, litigated in the adminis-
trative setting:
Because of the emerging application of issue exhaustion in so-
cial security cases, a growing number of claimants are being de-
nied the opportunity even to have a day in court to vindicate
their legal rights on the basis of a procedural technicality—the
failure to have formally raised and preserved legal issues and
arguments in the previous “informal” adjudicative proceedings.
This new “kafkaesque” trap for the unwary has particularly
troubling consequences for unrepresented and under-
represented claimants.  Since bar admission is not required for
representation at administrative proceedings, many law of-
fices—particularly financially strapped legal services offices—
cover a large portion of their public benefits adjudications with
paralegals and reserve their lawyers for court proceedings on ju-
dicial review.  In addition, a significant portion of low-income
claimants simply cannot obtain access to a representative and
have to appear pro se.132
Although preclusion is justified as a neutral doctrine that seeks to
achieve efficiency, its application can tend to cut off judicial access
for those, like the poor, who lack adequate counsel and cannot
meaningfully assess the consequences of litigation choices.
H. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Finally, many civil procedure courses close the semester with a
discussion of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”).  ADR ini-
tially appeared as an alternative to the adversary process in the
expectation that using informal procedures would reduce costs, in-
crease access, and nurture autonomy.  Commentators, however, in-
creasingly question whether ADR makes good on its promises,
especially in cases involving the poor, women, and minorities.
Some commentators question the fairness of using mediation in
131. For a description of Administrative Law Judges and how the terms of their
office differ from those of Article III judges, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 77, at 46- R
47.
132. Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue Ex-
haustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
1289, 1293-94 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
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family disputes where one party, typically the woman, has less fi-
nancial power; they also see “mandatory” ADR (used as an ad-
junct to judicial proceedings) as inconsistent with the theory of
voluntarism that justifies alternative dispute processes.133  On the
other hand, ADR may, in certain settings, offer transformative
possibilities for affected individuals—the human rights commu-
nity’s use of reconciliation proceedings in nations making the tran-
sition from authoritarian regimes offers an important example.
The relative merits of ADR for the poor and marginalized can be
explored through discussion of In re African-American Slave De-
scendant’s Litigation, in which the court denied plaintiffs’ motion
to appoint a mediator in a case seeking relief against corporate de-
fendants for injuries resulting from slavery in the United States.134
III. CONCLUSION
The concept of neutrality often is said to be the hallmark of pro-
cedural legitimacy.  Detached from any principle or party, objectiv-
ity lends normative value to the adjudicative enterprise.135
Introducing issues of poverty and inequality into the procedure
curriculum may be said to violate this core requirement.  But we do
not need to invoke the Legal Realists to know that an essential
feature of a public judicial system is its accessibility to all claim-
ants.136  As J.A. Jolowicz writes, “it is of little value to have a sys-
133. See Carol Lefcourt, Women, Mediation and Family Law, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 266, 269 (1984) (“The unequal financial and social power of men and women
makes mediation an unfair means of resolving family-related disputes.  Women do not
have equal bargaining power and cannot assert equal power in an informal setting
unrepresented by counsel.”); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra
note 9, at 1233; Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anath- R
ema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 679 (1986) (warning that ADR could reduce important
rights, including those to child-support awards, to “a mirage”); Andrew R. Imbrogno,
Arbitration As an Alternative to Divorce Litigation: Redefining the Judicial Role, 31
CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 429-30 (2003) (“As a group, women are more likely to be char-
acterized by economic disempowerment than men . . . .  Not only does this give cause
for concern about the willingness with which some women enter into arbitration
agreements, it is also cause for concern about the substantive results women achieve
through arbitration.”).
134. 272 F. Supp. 2d 755 (N.D. Ill. 2003); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE,
supra note 9, at 1228. R
135. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Objectivity, Morality, and Adjudication, in OBJECTIVITY
IN LAW AND MORALS 66, 79 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001).
136. Cappelletti, supra note 20, at 688 (“Clearly, courts and court procedures . . . R
can no longer be instruments suitable only for the protection of privileged elites.
They must embrace the entire society.  Thus, one essential—possibly the essential—
feature of a really modern system of administration of justice must be its effective,
and not merely theoretical, accessibility to all.”).
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tem of judicature with carefully formulated guarantees, if none but
the rich can afford to make use of it.”137  The concerns of the poor
are not simply one of a number of perspectives from which to as-
sess the existing legal system.  Rather, without locating civil proce-
dure in its political, social, and economic context, one cannot
meaningfully determine whether the rules provide effective, and
not merely theoretical, access for all claimants.  Unless we want
our teaching “to ratify the world ‘as is’”138—and so to encourage
uncritical acceptance of existing legal arrangements—the first-year
course by necessity must provide a conceptual framework that in-
cludes poverty and inequality as factors for evaluation.
137. Id. at 688-89 (quoting John Anthony Jolowicz, Fundamental Guarantees in
Civil Litigation: England, in FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL
LITIGATION 142 (M. Cappelletti & D. Tallon eds., 1973)).
138. Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice
Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65, 69
(2003).
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